Optimizely breach exposes 178 sites to card-stealing malware
Supply chain attack via A/B testing script hit Air France-KLM, IKEA, HSBC and Zoom, with card theft and crypto wallet swapping
Understanding the Case
- 178 organizations had compromised scripts, including Air France-KLM, IKEA, HSBC, Zoom, Ledger, Transavia and Salesforce
- The code was active for roughly 16 hours, from 5:21 to 22:00 Paris time, on November 16
- Payments processed in external modules such as Stripe and Adyen, displayed in a separate frame, escaped capture
The malicious code that hit major brand websites on Monday (16) did not exploit flaws in those companies' servers. It was inserted at a single point shared by all of them: Optimizely, the experimentation platform used to test different versions of web pages.
According to Report URI, the company that discovered the campaign and sells tools to detect this type of intrusion, 178 organizations loaded the script without knowing it. Among them are Air France-KLM, Transavia, IKEA, HSBC, Zoom, Ledger, Salesforce, BBC and CNN.
The list of affected parties is considered likely incomplete by Report URI itself. The code circulated between 5:21 and 22:00 Paris time, a window of about sixteen hours.
A single vendor, 178 storefronts
The vector is what the industry classifies as a supply chain attack: instead of breaking into each target, the actor compromises a vendor common to all of them. In this case, the A/B testing service that injects scripts into pages to measure conversion.
Because Optimizely delivers code executed in the visitor's browser, any tampering with what it serves propagates instantly across its entire customer base. None of the 178 organizations had their internal systems accessed.
What the code did
According to Report URI, the malware captured card numbers typed directly into payment forms hosted on the site. Transactions completed in external modules such as Stripe or Adyen, which appear in an isolated frame, were beyond the script's reach.
The code also replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses displayed or copied with addresses controlled by the attacker. The swap occurred even when the text was copied from another application, as long as the tab of the compromised site remained open.
There was also a third front: attempts to compromise iPhones and iPads running outdated operating systems, extending the reach beyond the browser.
Who needs to act and how
Anyone who did not visit any of the sites listed on November 16 is, in principle, not exposed. For those who paid by card on one of those pages during the sixteen-hour window, the recommendation is to monitor statements closely.
If any suspicious charge is identified, the guidance is to contact the issuing bank and request that the card be blocked. The swapping of crypto wallet addresses requires extra attention from anyone who copied receiving data on those sites.
Practical Impact
The episode lays bare the structural fragility of the third-party script stacks that sustain the commercial web: analytics, A/B testing, chat and advertising run with the same privileges as the page hosting them. A single compromised vendor produces an effect disproportionate to the attacker's effort.
From an operational standpoint, defense involves inventorying and restricting these scripts, adopting integrity policies and migrating payment forms to isolated iframes — precisely the design that, according to Report URI, protected transactions via Stripe and Adyen in this incident.